?Is Pakistan Recognizing Israel Out of Choice or Compulsion

?Is Pakistan Recognizing Israel Out of Choice or Compulsion

The possibility of recognizing Israel is one of the foreign policy topics that causes the quietest and conjecture in Pakistan. Fearing both public indignation and ideological retribution, successive governments have either neglected the subject entirely or addressed it behind closed doors for decades. However, recent changes in the geopolitical landscape, mounting economic strain, and subtle nudges from abroad have rekindled rumours among Islamabad’s power structures. Previously taboo subjects are increasingly being subtly discussed in drawing rooms, boardrooms, and even power brokers’ villas.

But there is a paradox at the moment. Normalization is being attempted under the shadow of political fragility, public disillusionment, and international expectations rather than from a position of strength. Pakistan today faces a geopolitical conundrum as its long-standing allies, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, change their positions. Should it stick to its principles or change its direction in an attempt to maintain its waning international significance? This research reveals that the solution is a complicated interaction of lost chances, elite interests, and outside forces rather than merely ideology or diplomacy.

Strategic Miscalculations and Missed Bargains:

Ideology, identity, and past alliances have long been the basis of Pakistan’s resistance to recognizing Israel. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the country’s founding father, was adamantly against the establishment of Israel and supported the Palestinian cause out of moral obligation and solidarity with the Muslim world at large. As Pakistan established itself as a major player in the Islamic bloc, this stance remained at the Centre of its foreign policy throughout the Cold War. This position was strengthened by organizations such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), which obligated Pakistan to support the political and sentimental goal of Palestinian statehood.

A potentially pivotal moment arrived in the early 2000s. Following 9/11, General Pervez Musharraf enjoyed a unique period of strategic goodwill with the United States. Under his direction, Pakistan tried out diplomatic connections and other covert approaches to Israel, such as semi-public meetings. But Musharraf held back from making a firm move, even though he had authority over the domestic political system and a moderate reputation internationally. Recognition was avoided due to religious sensitivities, the symbolic significance of Jinnah’s policy, and the fear of public backlash. This, according to many foreign policy analysts, was Pakistan’s finest opportunity to exchange normalization for tangible geopolitical or economic benefits.

?Is Pakistan Recognizing Israel Out of Choice or Compulsion

The conflict between political prudence and economic interests is further demonstrated by Nawaz Sharif’s several terms in office. Though never formally verified, persistent rumors have been circulating about the Sharif family’s business ties to Jewish lobbies and investors overseas, especially in London and the Gulf. During his tenure, there were also a number of stories indicating that discreet delegations were dispatched to Israel, presumably for diplomatic, business, or espionage purposes. These offered plausible deniability because they were never formally acknowledged. In the meantime, the regional environment began to change as a result of the improving ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel, particularly in the context of economic modernization. Pakistan’s inaction started to appear less principled and more antiquated.

The opposition to Israel’s recognition during Imran Khan’s tenure as prime minister was arguably the most overtly ideological. Khan, who is well-known for his religious speech and populist appeal, took a strong public stand against any chance of normalization. In a televised interview, he cited Jinnah’s opinions and even went so far as to claim that he would not be able to answer to Allah if he recognized Israel. Large swaths of the public found resonance in these words, which strengthened the traditional attitude. However, insiders speculate that Khan’s political isolation and eventual overthrow may have been exacerbated by his refusal to adhere to certain military and regional expectations, particularly about Israel. His rejection signaled a turning point where ideological coherence seemed to conflict with power politics, whether or not they were directly related.

What was lost during these years of hesitation?

In exchange for scientific cooperation, agricultural innovation, and even potential access to powerful Western lobbyists, Pakistan had the chance to use recognition at different times. By signing the Abraham Accords, nations like the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Sudan were able to obtain economic packages, de.

Defense agreements, and improved international standing. However, without gaining any discernible strategic advantage, Pakistan stuck to its guns. It lost the opportunity to influence the terms of engagement on its own by failing to establish recognition requirements sooner, like as development aid or concessions for Palestinians.

Looking back, Pakistan’s strategy towards Israel over the last 20 years shows a pattern of strategic errors. It did not take advantage of favorable diplomatic opportunities to achieve significant achievements, nor did it firmly maintain its ideological stance in a transformative way. Rather, it hovered in a state of ambiguity—publicly rebellious but inwardly inquisitive, principled in words but cautious in action. Due to this ambiguity, the nation now faces increased pressure and diminished bargaining strength, which could lead to decisions that are motivated more by coercion than by strategy.

Current Compulsions and the Future Policy:

The issue of recognizing Israel has come up again as Pakistan navigates its most precarious political juncture in recent memory, but not through democratic agreement or open parliamentary debate, but rather covertly, under the pressure of both internal desperation and exterior expectations. The current administration, which is frequently criticized for having no democratic mandate and depending on the backing of power brokers, doesn’t seem prepared to make such significant foreign policy decisions. However, some may view this particular weakness as the ideal opportunity, allowing a highly unpopular setup to take contentious but daring actions without worrying about the repercussions on the election.

It has long been clear that the elite wants to change Pakistan’s regional stance. According to some reports, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, the former COAS, supported normalizing relations with Israel during his term because he saw it as a practical step towards restoring relations with the West and ensuring economic stability. Such contentious changes have frequently been veiled by civilian governments, particularly ones thought to be appointed or supported by the establishment. The primary Power brokers’ drive for normalization in this setting is not new; rather, it is the time that has altered, with fewer barriers standing in the way now than in the past.

The geopolitical environment is rapidly changing on the outside. Many Arab and Muslim nations have been prompted to reconsider their stances on Israel by the Abraham Accords, which were pushed by American diplomacy. Citing economic incentives and national interests, countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan, and recently Syria have chosen to normalize their relations. Saudi Arabia, which has long been seen as the guardian of pan-Islamic sentiment, has made gradual moves to engage Israel in security and diplomatic discussions. Pakistan is isolated by this regional change, which makes its refusal to participate seem more inflexible and counterproductive. Meanwhile, major allies like the United States and international financial institutions are implying, whether explicitly or implicitly, that recognition of Israel could help open doors to investment and aid.

The Pakistani populace, however, is still steadfastly dedicated to the Palestinian cause in spite of growing pressure. The belief that aiding Palestine is both a national moral obligation and a religious one has been instilled in generations. This view is still reflected and amplified by conservative media voices, religious parties, and civil society activists. Formal recognition of Israel runs the potential of causing political backlash, large-scale demonstrations, and a further decline in the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of its citizens. Any abrupt change is still seriously hampered by the conflict between public conviction and elite pressure.

Perhaps the most significant question is whether Pakistan has any meaningful bargaining power left. Islamabad might have been able to negotiate military technology, economic concessions, or mediation roles in regional disputes if it had recognized Israel in 2005 or 2010. Pakistan’s action may no longer have the same diplomatic significance now that the tide has already turned and many other Muslim countries have normalized relations. The risk is that the current leadership may seek recognition for elite benefits, geopolitical favors, or personal legitimacy in the eyes of Western powers, rather than using it for the benefit of the country.

Thus, the debate today is no longer about whether Pakistan should recognize Israel—but whether it can still do so on its own terms. The risk is that this long-delayed decision may now be taken not with strategic clarity, but with political expediency. And in doing so, it may benefit those in power, but cost the state its last reservoir of principled diplomacy.

Charting a Realistic Path:

Pakistan must approach normalization with Israel as a measured step that upholds national dignity, builds public trust, and produces real benefits rather than as a surrender if it is unavoidable. Given its position as a diplomatic and spiritual leader in the Muslim world, Saudi Arabia’s recognition of Israel should be a prerequisite. By using this order, Pakistan could present its choice as a component of a larger Muslim consensus as opposed to a stand-alone concession.
Additionally, participation ought to be advantageous to the general public and visible. Israeli investment could show significant development benefits if it is directed through third-party middlemen into industries like technology, healthcare, and agriculture. Ideological opposition may lessen if common people observe better services, employment opportunities, and innovation—even if these are only loosely connected to Israel.

Above all, the action must have the support of the general public. Social divisions will widen if recognition is promoted by an unpopular, undemocratic system. According to history, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto only agreed to Bangladesh’s independence after obtaining a national mandate. Similarly, only a legitimately elected and trusted government cannow use strategic, religious, and emotional justifications to support recognition of Israel. Anything less runs the risk of internal strife and long-term instability.

Khurram Niaz

Khurramniaz929@outlook.com

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